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R E M E D I E S
Measuring a Civil-Discovery Sanction for Failure to Turn Over Requested Material
 CASE AT A GLANCE 
A sanction that is unrelated to misconduct is criminal and requires criminal instead of civil procedure. In 
a product liability lawsuit, the respondent, Goodyear, failed to turn over important tests before the parties 
settled. The petitioners, the Haegers—a couple who alleged Goodyear’s tires caused injuries—sought 
approval of a sanction based on their attorney fees. Complex and technical civil procedural rules and 
statutes, contempt, and the court’s inherent power will govern the Supreme Court’s decision. The issue 
before the Court is the specifi city of the causal link between Goodyear’s misconduct and the amount of the 
civil sanction. 
Goodyear Tire v. Haeger 
Docket No. 15-1406
Argument Date: January 10, 2017
From: The Ninth Circuit 
by Doug Rendleman
Washington and Lee Law School, Lexington, VA
ISSUE
Is a federal court required to tailor compensatory civil sanctions 
imposed under inherent powers to harm directly caused by 
sanctionable misconduct when the court does not afford sanctioned 
parties the protections of criminal due process?
FACTS
The Haegers brought a product liability lawsuit against tire 
manufacturer, Goodyear, charging that Goodyear’s G159 tire had 
failed, injuring them seriously. Civil discovery is the pretrial 
process where the parties exchange information leading to the full 
disclosure that prevents surprise and supports decisions on the 
merits. The Haegers’ discovery sought Goodyear’s tests of the tires. 
The Haegers and Goodyear settled the case on the i rst day of trial. 
During the pretrial-discovery process, Goodyear and its lawyers 
failed to produce certain important tests. After the settlement, the 
Haegers’ lawyer learned about those tests and moved for sanctions. 
The district court judge found that Goodyear should have produced 
the tests, and that Goodyear and its lawyers, hereafter just Goodyear, 
should be sanctioned because of “repeated and deliberate attempts 
to frustrate the resolution of this case on the merits.” Because Rule 
37, section 1927 and Rule 11, the usual bases for sanctions, weren’t 
available, the judge based the sanction on the court’s inherent 
power. 
The judge measured the Haegers’ compensatory award by their 
attorney fees. The $2,741,201.16 attorney fees awarded began 
to accrue with the Haegers’ First Request, the moment when 
Goodyear should have produced the tests. The trial judge wrote 
that “if Goodyear had responded to Plaintiffs’ First Request with 
all responsive documents, Goodyear might have decided to settle 
the case immediately.” It was possible to “conclude practically all of 
Plaintiffs’ fees and costs were due to misconduct.” 
On appeal of the compensatory award, the Court of Appeals held 
that the trial judge hadn’t abused discretion in either resorting 
to the inherent power or in i nding Goodyear’s bad faith. Nor was 
measurement by the Haegers’ attorney fee an abuse of discretion. 
The dissenting judge argued that the award was punitive, not 
compensatory, because it was not shown that the misconduct caused 
the amount of the award. Thus, according to contempt decisions, 
the judge should have followed criminal instead of civil procedure 
before imposing the punitive sanction. 
CASE ANALYSIS
Goodyear argues that a judge’s inherent-power sanction must 
be limited by causation principles. An award not caused by the 
wrongdoer’s misconduct is not compensatory, but criminal. A 
criminal sanction may not follow mere civil procedure. Instead, 
notes Goodyear, due process requires criminal procedure to 
mete out punitive punishment. Direct causation is required, and 
Goodyear asserts, that simply was not shown here. 
The Haegers counter that recovery of their attorney fee is tied to, 
and caused by, their loss from Goodyear’s failure to produce the test. 
The trial judge and the Court of Appeals acknowledged the need for 
a causal link and determined that Goodyear’s breach had resulted 
in the Haegers’ attorney fees. Goodyear’s failure to produce the 
tests permeated the whole case and caused the Haegers to expend 
attorney fees almost from the beginning. Directness in causation, 
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the Haegers argue, isn’t required and doesn’t add anything to 
causation. The Court of Appeals appropriately approved the district 
court’s decisions articulating the causal-link standard, inding a 
causal link, and setting the amount of attorney fees to award. 
Like most discovery sanction cases, Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. 
Haeger is protracted and technical. As argued, it combines a 
court’s inherent power with compensatory contempt. The implied 
power here is the judge’s ability to sanction a litigant’s bad-
faith misconduct that isn’t covered by another rule or statute. 
Compensatory contempt is a money award to the aggrieved party for 
breach of a court order. 
The inherent power has been a wild card in the legal deck, perhaps 
the joker. Contempt, including compensatory contempt, is also 
contested and imprecise because it is dificult to distinguish 
coercive contempt, compensatory contempt, and criminal contempt. 
Attorney fees are often awarded under the inherent power and for 
both compensatory contempt and an opponent’s procedural and 
discovery misconduct. 
The proper measurement rule for a sanction and its speciic 
application are different questions. Measurement of recovery is 
often uncertain. For example, pain and suffering and punitive 
damages leave a lot of discretion to the judge or jury. An approach 
to measurement requires a claimant’s proof of the loss to be only 
as speciic as the situation permits. A court will place the burden of 
uncertainty on the wrongdoer who caused the loss. 
The rule to measure a compensatory contempt award is the 
aggrieved party’s “actual harm,” from the contemnor’s misconduct; 
“actual” means that the misconduct caused the harm. Requiring 
aggrieved parties to prove their loss prevents the judge from 
following civil procedure to punish misconduct under the guise of 
compensatory contempt. 
Imprecision in measurement lurks in reaching a precise igure 
here. If Goodyear had produced the test, would it then have settled 
right away for more money? This is what the trial judge and the 
Court of Appeals majority thought and what the Haegers argue. Or 
as Goodyear argues, would it have followed production of the test 
with digging in for a trial or a later less-generous settlement? The 
problem of setting the aggrieved party’s harm from the misconduct 
is how to construct the counterfactual world that would have 
occurred without the misconduct, here Goodyear’s nondisclosure. A 
counterfactual is inescapably uncertain and speculative. 
SIGNIFICANCE
The case is important for litigators and business defendants. Courts 
haven’t been irm on discovery sanctions. A decision afirming an 
attorney-fees sanction for the $2,741,201.16 that the judge awarded 
the Haegers will send a message to lawyers and litigants that 
discovery is crucial to decisions on the merits and will strengthen 
judges’ hands in discovery disputes. 
An opinion that clariies the relationship between contempt, 
compensatory variety, and the inherent power in civil discovery 
sanctions would reduce confusion and improve the law. 
The decision might go either way. The case is factually complex, 
and the legal issues are inherently technical and controversial. The 
governing law and the lower courts’ opinions are murky. Either way, 
a divided opinion seems likely. 
Doug Rendleman is Huntley Professor at Washington and Lee Law 
School. He has written about the inherent power and compensatory 
contempt in Complex Litigation: Injunctions, Structural Remedies, 
and Contempt (2010) and Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff’s 
Remedy When Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U.Ill.L.F. 971. 
He can be reached at rendlemand@wlu.edu or 540.458.8934. 
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